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tions and confine itself to whether the reclassification is valid within
that context.
In conclusion, the court held the Water Master had not violated
the United States and the Tribe's due process rights, because the Tribe
had an opportunity to present evidence and have its case heard. However, the Water Master did not consider principles of beneficial use
and the court remanded the case for the district court or Water Master
for reconsideration using the appropriate standard.
KatherineIverson
Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d
853 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding (1) an Environmental Impact Statement
need only consider reasonable alternatives; (2) a substantial showing of
new information requires a supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement; and (3) additional reasonable and prudent measures can
involve only minor changes to a Record of Decision).
The opening of the Trinity River Dam and water diversion on the
Trinity River in Northern California caused the river environment to
diminish, subsequently resulting in a fishery resources reduction. After
a study determined a significant redirection of water flow would rehabilitate the river and fish populations, Congress passed two acts recommending the implementation of strategies to recreate the original
river environment. Federal, state, and tribal officials (collectively "officials") released an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), as well
as biological opinions ("BioOps"). The Department of the Interior
("Interior") then issued a Record of Decision ("ROD") ordering the
implementation of alternatives recommended in the EIS.
In December 2002, Westlands Water District ("Westlands") filed
suit against the Interior and the Hoopa Valley Tribe, along with the
officials and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and NEPA. Various water agencies and
power companies intervened as plaintiffs, while the Yurok Tribe and
the Hoopa Valley Tribe (collectively "tribes"), who relied on fishery
resources, intervened as a defendant. In March 2001, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a preliminary injunction limiting flow releases into the Trinity River. A year
later, the district court granted the defendant tribes' motion permitting increased flow and vacated the stay, allowing the case to move forward for disposition on the merits. Subsequently, all parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment.
The district court held: (1) NEPA applied to implementation of
the flow recommendations; and (2) the EIS improperly narrowed the
requisite Statement of Purpose and Need ("SPN") and failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives. The district court also imple-
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mented all non-flow measures and ordered the Interior and the tribes
to submit a supplemental EIS ("SEIS") addressing further alternatives
and mitigation measures. The Interior, the tribes, and the officials
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and Westlands cross-appealed.
On appeal, the court first examined the district court's decisions
that the SPN was unreasonable and the EIS did not explore and objectively evaluate reasonable alternatives. The court held the SPN was
reasonable, because the SPN was not arbitrary and capricious, and reversed the district court's ruling. The court reasoned NEPA required
an EIS to include a consideration and assessment of the environmental
consequences resulting from the proposed actions and alternatives to
the action, and no language in the EIS limited consideration of nonflow measures. Furthermore, the EIS was not arbitrary and capricious
because the officials' focus on habitat as the best way to restore natural
fish production was within the officials' discretion. Additionally, the
court reversed the district court's holding that the range of alternatives
considered in the EIS was unreasonable. The court reasoned the EIS
need not consider an infinite range of alternatives, but should consider
whether the selection and discussion of alternatives fostered informed
decision making and public participation.
The court then considered the district court's decision requiring
SEIS on the BioOps and the Preferred Alternative's impacts on California's power system reliability. The court determined that, under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, the SEIS was not required. The
court reasoned the BioOps did not present any new information requiring an SEIS and the original EIS analysis was sufficient to show
consequences of using flow. Furthermore, the Court reasoned SEIS
was not required regarding the Preferred Alternative's impact, based
on the Interior's previous determination that power generation losses
from release of flow amounted to a small fraction of the overall California power generation and the California energy crisis presented no
significant new circumstances.
Finally, the court addressed the district court's invalidation of two
reasonable and prudent measures ("RPMs") from the BioOps involving
changes under the Endangered Species Act. The court held that both
RPMs involved major changes and therefore upheld the district court's
ruling. The court reasoned the first RPM, requiring a plan to mitigate
the X2 movement, may possibly result in the reallocation of significant
amounts of water, affecting wildlife in waterways and causing a broad
effect overall. Additionally, the court reasoned the second RPM, which
required the immediate implementation of flow regimes, violated the
ESA's timing of the action regulation. Finally, the court rejected Westlands contentions on cross appeal based on merit. The court therefore
remanded the case to the district court as nothing remained to prevent
the implementation of the ROD.
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TENTH CIRCUIT
Delaunay v. Collins, No. 02-8097, 2004 U.S. App. ES 4032 (10th
Cir. Mar. 2, 2004) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting injunctive relief for use of a ditch water right even
though a member of the Northern Arapaho Indian Tribe lacked an
easement for the ditch).
Charlene Delaunay, Floyd Collins, and his sons, Gary and Rusty,
("Collins") were enrolled members of the Northern Arapaho Indian
Tribe of the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. Manual Delaunay,
Charlene's husband, was not a member of the tribe. Gary Collins was
the tribal water engineer on the reservation and was responsible for
administering water and enforcing the tribal water code. Forty acres of
the Delaunays' land included a state water right through Little Wind
River Ditch Number 5 ("Ditch"), and fifty-seven acres of their lease
property had a reserved water right through the Ditch. Collins owned
land adjacent to the Delaunays' lease-held land and similarly held a
reserved water right through the Ditch.
A feud between the Delaunays and Collins began when Collins intentionally blocked the Delaunay water supply because Manuel was not
a member of the tribe and, therefore, according to Collins, had no
right to be on the land. In addition to the water obstruction, the Delaunays alleged they received discriminatory treatment when they
enlisted the help of the tribal water board.
The Delaunays filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming seeking damages and injunctive relief claiming
race-based discrimination. Specifically, the Delaunays claimed Collins
deprived them of equal benefits of the law through Gary's abuse of his
position as tribal water engineer and deprived their real property
rights by blocking their water. A jury returned a unanimous verdict in
favor of the Delaunays and awarded $350,000 in damages. The district
court enjoined Collins from interfering with the Delaunays' water
rights and restrained Gary, as water engineer, from administering the
water in the Ditch.
The district court ruled on several pre-trial motions. The court
first denied the Collins' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law because the Delaunays presented sufficient evidence of racial discrimination to allow a reasonable jury to find in their favor. Second,
the court granted the Delaunays' motion for attorney's fees. Third, in
response to the Collins' motion for remittitur, the court upheld the
jury's finding of liability.
The Delaunays argued they suffered from discrimination because
Collins, who never had had a water dispute with any other tribal member, interfered with the Delaunay's water use by blocking access. Fur-

